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THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD: IT’S NOT 
WHAT IT IS, BUT HOW IT’S MADE, 
MEASURED, AND DECIDED 
MERCER BULLARD† 
The scope and substance of an investment adviser’s fiduciary 
duty has recently become a primary focus of U.S. legislators and 
regulators.  A U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“Commission” or “SEC”) study (“Section 913 Study”) required by 
section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”),1 concluded that 
broker-dealers should be subject to a fiduciary duty when 
providing personalized investment advice to retail investors.2  In 
a similar vein, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposed to 
expand the kind of investment advice that would trigger 
fiduciary obligations under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) for persons who provide 
investment advice to plans and plan participants.3  Both 
initiatives have provoked protests from legislators and the 
financial services industry that have, at least temporarily, 
stymied regulators’ plans. 
This Article addresses the SEC’s fiduciary rulemaking under 
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, but takes a step back from 
the debate to frame the discussion in a more holistic context.  
This author’s previous article on the fiduciary standard discussed 
how the implementation of a fiduciary duty is largely contextual; 
a variety of factors other than the scope and substance of the 
fiduciary duty are proximately related to achieving the social 
 
† Associate Professor of Law and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association 
Distinguished Lecturer, The University of Mississippi School of Law. 
1 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
2 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS (2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913study 
final.pdf. 
3 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263 (proposed Oct. 22, 
2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 86). 
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benefits that the fiduciary duty is intended to create.4  Achieving 
these benefits may depend on, among other things: (1) the 
limiting of “investment advice” to advice regarding securities, as 
opposed to, for example, insurance and banking products; (2) the 
private venues that are available to enforce this right, for 
example, arbitration, or state or federal court; (3) the conduct 
standards imposed under non-securities regulatory regimes, for 
example, ERISA for employee benefit plans, state insurance law 
for insurance products; (4) the powers and jurisdiction of 
applicable regulators, for example, the Commission, self-
regulatory organizations and states, enforcement versus 
rulemaking; and (5) the regulation of issuers and intermediaries, 
for example, mutual fund disclosure and broker sales practices.  
In each case, these factors turn on issues other than the scope—
who should have a fiduciary duty—and substance—what should 
that duty require—of the fiduciary duty. 
This Article considers three such factors that play an 
important role in framing the fiduciary debate: the rising 
prominence of a libertarian metric for evaluating the fiduciary 
duty; the development of a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers by 
their self-regulatory organization, rather than the Commission; 
and the existing fiduciary duty as applied in private claims, 
especially in arbitration proceedings.  The first factor is one that 
has recently assumed a prominent role.  The social utility of the 
fiduciary duty has generally been judged according to a 
utilitarian metric that evaluates social policy based on the 
policy’s effect on net social wealth.  Under this metric, the 
fiduciary duty is good policy if it results in an increase in net 
social wealth, even if accompanied by a decrease in some utilities, 
such as individual freedom.  Recent policy debates have reflected 
a competing metric for evaluating the fiduciary duty, however, 
based on libertarian values.  Under this libertarian metric, 
reductions in individual freedom beyond a certain point trump 
the utilitarian metric.  The fiduciary duty is not good social policy 
under a libertarian metric if it reduces individual freedom 




4 See generally Mercer Bullard, The Fiduciary Study: A Triumph of Substance 
over Form?, 30 REV. BANKING FIN. L. 171 (2011). 
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social wealth.  The SEC’s current paralysis with respect to 
Section 913 rulemaking may be largely attributable to 
policymakers’ shift from utilitarian to libertarian values. 
Next, this Article turns from the social metrics applied to 
evaluate the fiduciary duty to the second factor—the source of 
the fiduciary duty.  The current debate has focused on Congress 
(the Dodd-Frank Act) and the Commission (Section 913 
rulemaking) as the sources of an expanded fiduciary duty.  
However, the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers, the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), has already 
taken significant steps toward imposing a de facto fiduciary duty 
on the same broker-dealers to which a Section 913 rulemaking 
would apply.  FINRA’s new suitability rule, for example, 
embraces a strongly fiduciary approach.5  FINRA may be 
motivated to expand the fiduciary duty of broker-dealers in part 
because this position supports its stated goal of being designated 
the self-regulatory organization for investment advisers.6  The 
shift of the fiduciary debate to the FINRA arena may also reflect 
a broader re-alignment in the administrative state in which 
power is shifted from government agencies that are susceptible to 
political influence to more politically insulated SROs and other 
quasi-governmental entities.  However, there are signs that 
FINRA’s insulation from political factors may be on the wane. 
Finally, this Article moves from public sources of law—
Congress, the SEC, and FINRA—to the third factor—private 
sources of law.  A fiduciary duty as imposed by the Commission 
would not, and the existing quasi-fiduciary duty imposed by 
FINRA does not, create a private cause of action, but state law 
has long provided a private claim against broker-dealers for 
violating a fiduciary duty.  In comparison with the SEC’s and 
FINRA’s inchoate public law fiduciary duty, the private law 
fiduciary duty is well-developed and frequently litigated.7  
Fiduciary duty violations are the most frequently asserted claims 
in broker-dealer arbitration proceedings.8 
 
5 FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859. 
6 The Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 13–15 (2012) [hereinafter Investment Adviser 
Oversight Act Hearing] (statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority). 
7 See infra Part III; see generally infra note 124. 
8 See infra Part III, note 123. 
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However, the substance and scope of this private fiduciary 
duty is indeterminate.  The overwhelming majority of private 
claims are brought in arbitration, where arbitrators are not 
required to and do not explain their decisions, rather than in 
court, where public decisions allow for an empirical evaluation of 
claims.9  Some commentators have evaluated the “fairness” of 
arbitration claims based on plaintiffs’ win rates in fully litigated 
proceedings.10  This Article takes issue with this methodology on 
the ground that plaintiffs’ win rates actually reveal nothing 
about the substantive fairness or unfairness of arbitration as a 
whole.  Thus, the private arena in which broker-dealers’ fiduciary 
duties are actually being sorted out defies critical analysis, 
which, in turn, frustrates any attempt to evaluate the full effects 
of the development of a public fiduciary duty by the SEC or 
FINRA. 
I. SOCIAL METRICS OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
For the most part, the current debate about a Section 913 
rulemaking has assumed that the social metric that should be 
used to evaluate a fiduciary duty is a utilitarian one.11  The 
debate has focused on whether the benefits of the fiduciary duty 
would outweigh its costs, with each side disagreeing about the 
types and amounts of costs and benefits.12  Nonetheless, each side 
seems to agree about using such a cost-benefit, utilitarian 
analysis to decide what form of fiduciary duty, if any, would be 
good public policy.13  There is evidence, however, that the 
utilitarian rhetoric of some opponents of a fiduciary duty serves 
an ulterior, non-utilitarian motive.14  They may be motivated, in 
fact, by a libertarian metric that elevates individual freedom 
above utilitarian values.  This libertarian metric is consistent 
with the increasing purchase in elective politics of small 
government values and popular mistrust of cost-benefit analysis 
and social engineering by administrative agencies.  The fiduciary 
 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory 
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640–42 (2012) (describing “ ‘familiar script’ ” of 
efficiency, rationality, and cost-benefit analysis in administrative role). 
12 See Short, supra note 11, at 641. 
13 See id. 
14 See discussion infra notes 32–60. 
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duty may not hold up well under a libertarian metric.  Its future, 
therefore, may depend on the fiduciary debate being resolved 
beyond the influence of current Congressional politics. 
The term “utilitarian metric” is used here to refer to the 
evaluation of public policy based on its effect on net social wealth.  
Under this metric, the fiduciary duty would be preferable to the 
suitability standard that currently applies to broker-dealers15 if it 
caused a net increase in social wealth, regardless of the wealth 
effect as to any subset of society, such as investors who do not 
need the protection that the fiduciary duty offers.  For example, 
the fiduciary duty may be good policy if it corrects a market 
inefficiency arising from asymmetric information between 
broker-dealers and their customers.16  But some industry 
members have argued that a fiduciary duty may reduce net social 
wealth by raising the cost of some financial services, thereby 
leaving some existing broker-dealer customers unable to afford 
certain products or services.17  The fiduciary duty could generate 
a net decrease in social wealth if the additional costs incurred by 
society outweighed the improvement in investors’ investment 
outcomes.18 
 
15 FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859. 
16 See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer 
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, 25 J. FIN. PLAN., no. 7, 2012, at 28, 28–37, 
available at http://www.fpanet.org/journal/TheImpactoftheBrokerDealerFiduciary 
Standard (“Imposition of a universal fiduciary standard among financial advisers 
may result in a net welfare gain to society, and in particular to consumers who are 
ill-equipped to reduce agency costs on their own by more closely monitoring an 
adviser with superior information, although this will likely occur at the expense of 
the broker-dealer industry.”). 
17 See Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealers and 
Legislative Proposals To Improve Investment Adviser Oversight: Hearing on H.R. 
112-58 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkt. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 1–18 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
John Taft, Chairman, Security Industry and Financial Market Association and 
testimony of Terry Headley, President, National. Association of Insurance and 
Financial Advisors) (fiduciary duty could make it “economically unfeasible for 
financial professionals to work with less affluent clients”); SIFMA & OLIVER WYMAN, 
STANDARD OF CARE HARMONIZATION: IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC (2010) (Section 
913 fiduciary duty could make commission-based services more expensive for 
investors and “force the majority of these investors into fee-based managed accounts 
at a higher cost factor”). 
18 See Hearings, supra note 17 (noting that the “universal fiduciary standard of 
care” would force many brokers to discontinue providing many important services to 
middle-market clients). Contra Finke & Langdon, supra note 16 (“Empirical results 
provide no evidence that the broker-dealer industry is affected significantly by the 
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The utilitarian metric can be illustrated in the context of 
variable annuity sales, which have often been cited by regulators 
and investor advocates as emblematic of the improper sales 
practices of non-fiduciaries.19  Some argue that broker-dealers 
often recommend variable annuities to investors for whom they 
are not the best option, in part because broker-dealers receive 
higher compensation for selling a variable annuity than from 
selling another variable annuity or a mutual fund.20  Investors’ 
 
imposition of a stricter legal fiduciary standard on the conduct of registered 
representatives.”). 
19 See generally FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., MEMBERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES 
REGARDING DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES (2008), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=14663 
(imposing heightened suitability requirements for sales of variable annuities); NAT’L 
ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-35, THE NASD REMINDS MEMBERS 
OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING THE SALES OF VARIABLE ANNUITIES (1999); 
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-86, NASD REGULATION 
REMINDS MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATED PERSONS THAT SALES OF VARIABLE CONTRACTS 
ARE SUBJECT TO NASD SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS (1996); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N & 
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, JOINT SEC/NASD REPORT ON EXAMINATION 
FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER SALES OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
(2004); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, & FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS: REPORT OF EXAMINATIONS OF 
SECURITIES FIRMS PROVIDING “FREE LUNCH” SEMINARS 21–22 (2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf; Letter from AARP, N. Am. 
Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Fund Democracy, & Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Christopher 
Dodd, Chairman and Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Dev., U.S. Senate (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/39-Fill-In-The-Blank-Sec-913-Letter-2.3.10.doc (discussing 
abusive sales practices in sale of variable annuities to seniors); Advertising of Bonus 
Credit Variable Annuities, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ 
Industry/Regulation/Guidance/RCA/p015306 (last visited Dec. 31, 2013) (warning 
against misleading sales practices); Should You Exchange Your Variable Annuity?, 
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/ 
InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndInsurance/p006045 (last updated Mar. 2, 2006) (citing 
abusive sales practices); Variable Annuities: Beyond the Hard Sell, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/ 
annuitiesandinsurance/p005976 (last updated Aug. 31, 2009); James W. Watkins, 
Variable Annuities: Reading Between the Marketing Lines, COMMONSENSE 
INVESTSENSE (2002), http://investsense.com/variable-annuities/ (variable annuities 
are “one of the most overhyped, most oversold, and least understood investment 
products”); Liz Pulliam Weston, The Basics: The Worst Retirement Investment You 
Can Make, JOHN C. GOWER, http://www.jcgower.com/media/The$20Worst$20Retire 
ment$20Investment$20You$20Can$20Make.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
20 See, e.g., Prime Capital Services, Inc., Release No. 398, 2010 WL 2546835, at 
*38–40 (ALJ June 25, 2010) (administrative law judge finding that broker-dealers 
committed fraud in connection with sales of variable annuities to elderly customers 
and received commissions of up to 8.6%); Focus Point Solutions, Inc., Release No. 
3458, 2012 WL 3863221, at *1 (ALJ Sept. 6, 2012) (Undisclosed revenue sharing 
“agreement created incentives for [investment adviser] to favor a particular category 
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purchases of variable annuities therefore may result in 
suboptimal financial results for investors and impose negative 
net costs on society.21  In theory, the fiduciary duty would require 
that broker-dealers recommend the best product, thereby 
improving investors’ financial experience and increasing net 
social wealth.22 
Proponents of the fiduciary duty might argue that this could 
be accomplished in two ways.  First, the fiduciary duty could 
mandate enhanced disclosure of selling compensation, which, like 
price transparency generally, could promote competition and 
lower prices by heightening investors’ price sensitivity.23  Second, 
 
of mutual funds over other investments.”); see also Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties: 
Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing on S. 
J-111-88 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) [hereinafter Roper Testimony] (testimony of Barbara 
Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America) (“The most 
common problem faced by retail investors is sale of products to benefit the broker‘s 
bottom line rather than the client‘s financial well-being. In a fairly typical example, 
a broker might recommend a particular mutual fund or 529 plan or variable 
annuity, not because it has the lowest fees, the best management, or the best 
allocation of assets to match the client‘s investment goals, but rather because it pays 
the highest commission or makes revenue sharing payments to the firm.”); Barbara 
Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
31, 45 (2005) (discussing brokers’ incentives to engage in fraud). See generally 
Edward O’Neal, Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker Incentives, 55 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 76 (1999) (discussing broker-dealers’ incentives to recommend class of 
shares paying the highest selling compensation). 
21 See Scott Burns, Variable Annuity Watch, 2008, ASSETBUILDER, 
http://assetbuilder.com/blogs/scott_burns/archive/2008/08/22/variable-annuity-
watch-2008.aspx (estimating that variable annuities transfer approximately $25.6 
billion each year “of spendable investment returns” from vulnerable investors to the 
insurance industry); see also Benjamin Cummings & Michael Finke, The Economics 
of Fiduciary Investment Advice 8 (Sept. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701181 (“[P]roduct-
based compensation is ubiquitous within the industry and rarely leads to 
recommendations that are clearly in the best interest of the consumer.”). 
22 This assumes that broker-dealers would change their behavior under a 
fiduciary duty. This assumption may be incorrect because, as discussed infra Parts 
II, III, broker-dealers already may be subject to a de facto fiduciary duty. In 
addition, investors may be able to bring successful claims with respect to variable 
annuity sales practices under antifraud principles without needing to show breach of 
a fiduciary duty, although proving fiduciary claims generally will be easier because 
of lower standards of proof as to the broker-dealer’s intent and the cause of the 
plaintiff’s loss. 
23 See Conformation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements 
for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other 
Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration 
Form for Mutual Funds, Release No. 33-8358, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26341, 2004 WL 184973 (proposed 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, & 
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it could mandate recommendations that not only were suitable, 
but also were in the client’s best interests.  This would require 
the broker-dealer to recommend the best product for the 
customer, and not necessarily the one that pays the highest 
compensation. 
This analysis makes empirical assumptions on which some 
critics of the fiduciary duty disagree.  They argue that enhanced 
disclosure or a substantive best-interest standard might not 
produce enough benefits to outweigh any attendant increase in 
social costs.24  Two Republican Commissioners criticized the 
recommendations in the Section 913 Study on the ground that 
they lacked “a basis to reasonably conclude that a uniform 
standard or harmonization would enhance investor protection” 
and insisted upon a “stronger analytical and empirical 
foundation” before rulemaking could proceed.25 
The utilitarian metric as applied in the fiduciary duty 
context reflects an increasing emphasis on utilitarian analysis by 
Congress, the courts, and the Commission.  Examples include a 
series of recent D.C. Circuit cases in which the court vacated 
SEC rules for failing to conduct an adequate cost-benefit 
analysis.26  Members of Congress have attacked the SEC’s cost-
benefit analyses, holding one hearing titled “The SEC’s Aversion 
to Cost-Benefit Analysis,”27 and released a flurry of bills imposing 
greater cost-benefit requirements on agency rulemaking.28  The 
 
274) (proposing a rule to require additional disclosure of revenue sharing 
compensation); Cummings & Finke, supra note 21 (“Commissions for financial 
products are extremely opaque, and the industry has fought to maintain those that 
are most difficult to detect by consumers (e.g., 12b-1 fees on mutual funds).”). See 
generally Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1145 (2009) (showing that price salience correlates positively with price 
sensitivity).  
24 Kathleen Casey & Troy Paredes, Comm’rs, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers And 
Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Casey & Paredes], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm (criticizing 
Section 913 Study). 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. 
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
27 The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112 Cong. 1–3(2012) [hereinafter Cost-Benefit Hearing]. 
28 See, e.g., Small Business Freedom of Commerce Act of 2013, H.R. 168, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th 
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Commission has relented under this pressure, promising to hire 
dozens of additional economists29 and make evaluating the costs 
of regulation to the industry a top priority.30 
The fiduciary debate as framed above suggests that both 
proponents and critics of the fiduciary duty agree on using a 
utilitarian metric to measure the social value of the fiduciary 
duty.31  However, the use of a utilitarian metric by opponents of 
the fiduciary duty may actually reflect libertarian values.  
Libertarian values are implicated by the fiduciary duty because, 
for example, mandatory disclosure under a fiduciary duty may 
deny investors the freedom to contract privately for such 
disclosure while making them pay the costs of disclosure 
regardless of whether they need it.32  Requiring that broker-
dealers’ recommendations be in the best interests of customers 
would impose additional transaction costs on those customers 
who would otherwise make their own best-interest 
determinations, possibly without providing them with any 
countervailing benefit.  Certain legislators, judges, and 
regulators who are motivated by these libertarian concerns may 
 
Cong. (2012); Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. 
(2011); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1606, 112th Cong. (2011); SEC 
Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Flexibility 
Improvements Act of 2011, H.R. 527, 112th Cong. (2011). See generally Ben Protess, 
Lawmakers Push To Increase White House Oversight of Financial Regulators, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/lawmakers-push-to-
increase-white-house-oversight-of-financial-regulators. 
29 See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27 (oral and written testimony of Mary 
Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
30 See Memorandum from RSFI and OGC to the Staff of the Rulewriting 
Divisions and Offices on Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC 
Rulemakings (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_ 
guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf. 
31 See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (testimony 
of Chet Helck, Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry and Financial Market 
Association) (“SIFMA supports the establishment of a uniform fiduciary standard for 
broker-dealers and investment advisers when they provide personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning 
Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-cost-benefit-
analysis.html (“[R]epublicans and Democrats have come to agree on one issue: the 
essential need for cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory process. In fact, cost-benefit 
analysis has become part of the informal constitution of the U.S. regulatory state.”). 
32 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28–32 (1990) (comparing 
the cost and benefits of mandatory fiduciary duties versus freedom of contract in a 
corporate setting). 
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simply be using the more intellectually acceptable rhetoric of 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as cover.  This is an admittedly 
unprovable claim:  Any assertion that libertarian motives stand 
behind stated cost-benefit concerns is inherently subjective and 
arguably counterintuitive.  Nonetheless, there is evidence that 
the utilitarian concerns of cost-benefit advocates are motivated 
more by a desire to rein in rulemaking per se than to produce 
more accurate utilitarian analysis.33 
In some cases, the cost-benefit analysis demanded by critics 
does not square with a utilitarian metric because it appears not 
to be practicably achievable.  In a series of decisions vacating 
SEC rules,34 the D.C. Circuit has applied a seemingly impossible 
standard to meet, requiring that, no matter what cost-benefit 
findings the Commission had made, it was always required to go 
one step further.35  The empirical analysis demanded by the SEC 
Commissioners who dissented from the Section 913 study could 
not practicably be accomplished by the agency in any reasonable 
timeframe, if at all.36  They made it clear that any rulemaking 
 
33 See Short, supra note 11, at 668–69 (finding that the dominant critique of 
regulation in academic literature reflects libertarian concern that regulation is 
coercive). 
34 See supra note 26. 
35 See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1811, 1827–28 (2012). 
36 For example, they argued that the Commission should conduct an “[a]nalysis 
of the investor returns (controlling for risk and investor characteristics such as age, 
income, and education) generated under the two existing regulatory regimes.” 
Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24. It would not be possible to identify 
with any precision the category of accounts that fit within a particular regime—it is 
the overlapping nature of commission, and fee-based arrangements, that has created 
the very problem that a universal fiduciary is intended to address—much less to 
calculate with any precision the investment returns experienced under a fiduciary 
and a non-fiduciary regime. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
519 (2009) (“There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be 
marshaled.”). There have been studies that address the general question of the value 
of brokers’ services, but they are so cabined by caveats as to provide little concrete 
direction as to the precise contours of the fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Daniel 
Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund 
Industry 2 (Nov. 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://business. 
rice.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty_and_Research/Academic_Areas/Finance/Seminar_PD
Fs/bbenefits_Nov2004.pdf; Mercer Bullard et al., Investor Timing and Fund 
Distribution Channels 2–3 (June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545 (load fund investors experience larger performance 
gaps than no-load fund investors); Mercer Bullard & Edward S. O’Neal, The Costs of 
Using a Broker To Select Mutual Funds (Inst. for Highest Educ. Law & Governance 
Monograph 07-03, 2006), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/mono 
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conducted without doing this analysis “would be ill-conceived at 
best and harmful at worst.”37  When agencies have requested 
cost-benefit data that critics have demanded they consider, they 
have been roundly chastised, as illustrated by Congressional and 
industry responses to a recent DOL request for economic data.38  
A bill passed by the House in August 2012 generally prohibited 
agency rulemaking until the national unemployment rate 
declined below six percent.39  The idea that a specific national 
unemployment rate could be a rational determinant of the 
utilitarian value of specific SEC rulemaking is inherently 
unreasonable, but it is consistent with the advancement of a 
libertarian metric, albeit clothed as a utilitarian one. 
A libertarian metric provides a more coherent explanation of 
the position of cost-benefit advocates.  Cost-benefit advocates 
embrace utilitarian analysis when more paternalistic policies are 
being considered, whereas they have eschewed utilitarian 
analysis when the public policies considered would increase 
individual freedom rather than constrain it.  The current 
regulatory environment has provided a relatively rare 
opportunity to see this inconsistency in action.  Under the Dodd-
Frank Act and the Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act (the 
 
graph/07-03.pdf (discussing higher expenses of broker-sold funds); Diane Del 
Guercio et al., Broker Incentives and Mutual Fund Market Segmentation 35–36 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16312, 2010), available at 
https://www2.bc.edu/jonathan-reuter/research/NBER_WP16312.pdf (evaluating 
performance of mutual funds sold in direct and broker-sold distribution channels). 
37 Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24. 
38 See Letter from Dale E. Brown, President & CEO, Fin. Servs. Inst., to John 
Kline & George Miller, House Educ. & Workforce Comm., U.S. House of 
Representatives (July 10, 2012), available at http://www.financialservices.org/ 
uploadedFiles/FSI_Content/Latest_News/Miller-Kline%20Fiduciary%20Letter.pdf 
(responding to Borzi letter dated June 20, 2012); Letter from Congressional 
Democrats to Hilda Solis, Sec’y of Labor, Dep’t of Labor (June 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.sparkinstitute.org/content-files/File/Dem%20Letter%20to%20DOL%20re 
%20Fiduciary%20Proposal%206-25-12.pdf (describing Borzi data request as 
“unrealistic in scope and timing”); Letter from Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Sec’y for 
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Labor, to John Kline & George Miller, House 
Educ. & Workforce Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (June 20, 2012), available 
at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/KlineMillerfiduciaryupdateletter.pdf (discussing data 
request). See generally Darla Mercado, FSI Unloads on Borzi, INVESTMENT NEWS 
(July 10, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120710/FREE/ 
120719992 (discussing Financial Services Institute response to DOL request for 
data). 
39 See H.R. Res. 4078, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted). 
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“JOBS Act”),40 enacted only sixteen months apart, Congress 
ordered the Commission to engage in rulemaking at opposite 
ends of the paternalistic-to-libertarian regulatory spectrum.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act requires rules generally increasing regulation, 
while the JOBS Act requires rules generally lessening it.41  The 
same members of Congress who have criticized the SEC’s cost-
benefit analysis in connection with Dodd-Frank rulemaking that 
they oppose have expressed no such concerns regarding JOBS 
Act rulemaking that they support.42  They have complained that 
the Commission has not spent enough time considering the costs, 
for example, of the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that issuers 
disclose information regarding certain minerals produced in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“conflict minerals”), while 
expressing no such concern regarding the JOBS Act exemption 
for crowd funding securities offerings and private offerings under 
Regulation D. 
The seemingly contradictory positions of cost-benefit 
advocates have been particularly apparent in connection with the 
SEC’s rulemaking on conflict minerals and the private offering 
exemption.43  Two Republican SEC Commissioners voted against 
and issued critiques of the SEC’s conflict minerals rule, the 
statutory deadline for which had passed seventeen months 
earlier, on the ground that the SEC staff’s cost-benefit analysis 
was inadequate.44  One week later, the same Commissioners 
supported a proposal to eliminate the ban on general solicitation 
 
40 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012). 
41 Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting 
To Adopt a Final Rule Regarding the Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Paredes Minerals Statement], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212tap-minerals.htm. 
42 See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27. 
43 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General 
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-
9354, 2012 WL 4356706 (proposed Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/2012/33-9354.pdf; Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 
2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-
67716.pdf; Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63547 (proposed Dec. 15, 
2010), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf. 
44 See Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41; Daniel Gallagher, Comm’r, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule To 
Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provision 
(Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Gallagher Minerals Statement], available at 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212dmg-minerals.htm. 
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and advertising without even mentioning cost-benefit 
requirements, much less whether the requirements had been 
satisfied.45  The conflict minerals rulemaking missed its 270-day 
deadline by more than seventeen months, while the general 
solicitation and advertising proposal was only fifty-seven days 
past its ninety-day deadline.46  Nonetheless, the Republican 
Commissioners argued the former needed more work and should 
be delayed further, while the latter should not even have been 
subject to public notice and comment, much less any cost-benefit 
analysis.47  They would have held the former rulemaking, which 
 
45 See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open 
Meeting To Propose Rule Amendments Eliminating the Prohibition Against General 
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings (Aug. 29, 
2012) [hereinafter Paredes Rule 506 Statement], available at http://sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2012/spch082912tap.htm (supporting amendments to Regulation D); Daniel 
Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: 
Proposed Rules To Eliminate the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings (Aug. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter Gallagher Rule 506 Statement], available at http://sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2012/spch082912dgm.htm. 
46 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(requiring rulemaking no later than ninety days after the Act’s effective date of April 
5, 2012, that is, by July 4, 2012); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring 
rulemaking no later than 270 days after the Act’s effective date of July 22, 2010, 
that is, by April 17, 2011). The JOBS Act deadline applies to the final rule, whereas 
only a proposal was issued on August 29, so the Commission will miss the final 
deadline by more than fifty-seven days. The Commission provided for a thirty-day 
comment period, and SEC Chairman Schapiro promised that the Commission would 
take action “shortly thereafter,” which means adoption of a final rule around October 
5, or ninety-four days past the JOBS Act deadline. The Commission had planned to 
issue an interim rule without notice and comment but reversed its position under 
pressure from investor advocates. See Schapiro’s Boss, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2012, 
7:06 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873234019045781573 
92212779684 (describing SEC Chairman Schapiro as “fold[ing] faster than Jerry 
Brown in a union negotiation” after discussions with investor advocates); SEC 
Announces Additional Delay on General Solicitation Rule Change, CORE 
COMPLIANCE & LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.corecls.com/compliance-corner/general/ 
sec-announces-additional-delay-on-general-solicitation-rule-change (last visited Jan. 
8, 2014); Letter from Fund Democracy et al. to  Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-
ii/jobstitleii-59.pdf (noting that issuing an interim rule without public notice and 
comment would violate the APA); see also Letter From Fund Democracy et al. to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-60.pdf (describing issues for 
which costs and benefits must be evaluated pursuant to APA). 
47 See Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41. Congressman Patrick 
McHenry scheduled a hearing to examine Chairman Schapiro’s “failure” to meet the 
JOBS Act deadline, which he attributed to her “ideological opposition” to the Act’s 
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would increase regulatory burdens, to a high cost-benefit 
standard, while holding the deregulatory rulemaking, which 
would reduce regulatory burdens, to no cost-benefit standard at 
all.48  Nor has either Republican had any objection to the SEC’s 
continuing failure to take final action on prior Dodd-Frank Act 
mandate to amend the same private offering rules to bar bad 
actors from relying on the exemption.  The one-year deadline for 
that rulemaking passed thirteen months before the Commission 
proposed private offering amendments under the JOBS Act.49 
The Commissioners’ intermittent advocacy for more rigorous 
cost-benefit analysis is far more consistent with libertarian 
values than utilitarian ones, which begs the question of why they 
do not simply argue from explicitly libertarian principles?  One 
reason may be that libertarian principles are often associated 
with the kind of anti-intellectual populism that is considered 
simplistic and extremist in the elite regulatory community.50  
 
mandate. See Letter from Patrick McHenry, Chairman, Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. 
Serv. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter McHenry Letter], available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012-08-16-PMC-to-Schapiro-
SEC-general-solicitation-due-8-30.pdf; see also Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the AICPA Council Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
(May 17, 2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch051712tap.htm 
(discussing two topics—the JOBS Act and cost-benefit analysis—without any 
mention of cost-benefit issues as related to the JOBS Act). 
48 See also McHenry Letter, supra note 47 (“By kicking the can down the road, 
you [SEC Chairman Schapiro] are abdicating your responsibility to follow the law, 
failing to fulfill your sworn commitment to this Subcommittee, and ignoring the will 
of Congress and the President of the United States.”); Paredes Rule 506 Statement, 
supra note 45; Gallagher Rule 506 Statement, supra note 45. 
49 See Dodd-Frank Act § 926. The Commission proposed amendments on May 
25, 2011. See Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9211 (proposed May 25, 2011), available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/33-9211.pdf. In addition, neither Republican 
objected to the SEC’s failure to adopt final Dodd-Frank-mandated amendments to 
Regulation D’s accredited investor standard until December 21, 2011—more than 
eighteen months after the DFA became law—there was no deadline for this 
rulemaking. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act 
Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-
9287.pdf (adopting amendments mandated by section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
although Commissioner Paredes objected that the proposal did not include a 
grandfathering provision); Statement of Troy Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Remarks at the Open Meeting To Propose Rules Regarding Net Worth 
Standard for Accredited Investors (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/ 
speech/2011/spch012511tap-2.htm. 
50 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Role of Rules in Antitrust Analysis, 2006 UTAH L. 
REV. 605, 612 n.20. 
FINAL_BULLARD 2/27/2014  6:20 PM 
2013] FIDUCIARY STANDARD: IT’S NOT WHAT IT IS 351 
Individual freedom as an intrinsic value has currency in electoral 
politics, but the appointees of politicians who espouse individual 
liberty principles do not carry that flag into the regulatory arena.  
For example, supporters of crowdfunding and permitting general 
solicitation and advertising in private offerings argue that any 
resulting economic losses to investors will be small relative to the 
economic benefits;51 they generally do not argue that allowing 
investors greater individual freedom—even if the result is that 
they make bad investment decisions—has intrinsic social value.52  
The concept of freedom typically finds its voice in the form of 
arguments for “free” markets, which are primarily based on the 
utilitarian view that free markets will maximize net social 
wealth.53  In other words, it is not the enhanced freedom of 
markets, and their participants, that justifies deregulatory 
policies, but the capacity of market-directed outcomes to create 
greater net social wealth than government-directed outcomes.54 
Another reason that libertarian metrics are not openly 
embraced in debates about SEC rulemaking is that these metrics 
implicitly reject the very raison d’etre of a regulatory agency—to 
make public policy in complex fields based on expert evaluation 
of social costs and benefits.55  The libertarian metric doubts the 
 
51 Jason Best & Sherwood Neiss, SEC’s Proposed Rule on General Solicitation 
Reads, “Sorry…Please Hold…It’s Too Complicated for Us”, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 31, 
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/31/secs-proposed-rule-on-general-solicitation-
reads-sorryplease-hold-its-too-complicated-for-us (“[L]ifting the ban . . . will allow 
private companies to raise money from a larger pool of ‘accredited investors.’ ”). 
52 It is not only the value of individual liberty that is difficult to quantify; the 
reduction in utility caused by the loss of one investment dollar may also depend on 
the social context. As Paul Slovic and others, have explained, the social context 
surrounding an event can increase the risk that the event presents. See Roger E. 
Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK 
ANALYSIS 177, 179 (1988). For example, the effect of the Three Mile Island nuclear 
reactor accident far exceeded what a cost-benefit analysis would have found was the 
risk of such an event. Id. Slovic has argued that the “traditional cost-benefit and risk 
analyses neglect the[] higher-order impact[] [caused by social amplification of 
loss] . . . (and thereby underestimate the overall risk from the event).” Id. 
Incorporating the social amplification of risk into cost-benefit analysis is necessary 
to “bring the technical assessment of risk more in line with a fuller determination of 
risk.” Id. One example of this theory in action is the social amplification of the risk of 
Madoff-like fraud when it results from a regulator’s failure to act on credible tips, 
rather than from investors’ own decisions or the absence of specific rules. The risk of 
a dollar lost to the former is far greater. 
53 See Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner’s Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1006 (1987). 
54 See id. 
55 See Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: 
Agency Policy Making Under A Necessity-Based Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 277 
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very capacity of administrative agencies to improve the human 
condition through social engineering, as opposed to allowing the 
free market to evolve on its own.56  Indeed, many government 
officials may be naturally uncomfortable with a libertarian 
metric because it undermines the premise of government—that 
effective public policy can be derived from public processes.57  
Deregulatory SEC Commissioners may feel consciously 
compelled to support, or at least not openly undermine, this 
premise of public service, or they may unconsciously be prisoners 
of a kind of inverted regulatory capture.58 
Alternatively, they may see an inconsistency in making 
empirical arguments about the cost of regulations while also 
arguing for individual liberty—a social utility that defies 
empirical analysis.  They also may feel more comfortable and/or 
believe they may be more effective espousing a mainstream cost-
benefit analysis.  There is no reason to believe that SEC 
Commissioners are any less sensitive to peer norms than other 
professionals.  Indeed, this Article’s discussion of freedom for 
freedom’s sake itself operates within the same constraints.  
Attempting to inject such an unquantifiable social utility as 






(2011) (“Agencies are, and always have been, necessary because they are ‘process’ 
experts: they have the tools available to make complex, and often fluid, regulatory 
decisions that the constitutional branches cannot.”). 
56 See generally Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative 
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1815–16 (2012) 
(discussing dynamics of political-reason giving in administrative decisions). 
57 See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1995) (characterizing post-New Deal administrative 
state as unconstitutional and inconsistent with separation of powers); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 446–48 
(1987) (discussing failure to incorporate constitutional commitment to checks and 
balances into regulatory administration). 
58 See Carl Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar 
Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 174 (2000) (describing legal scholars’ 
“internalized attachment to government” and views of “government as efficacious 
rather than susceptible to the mood swings of a pathological society” as reflecting a 
“confident identification with government”). 
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redistributional policies59—into a regulatory debate may be more 
likely to be met with polite disdain than afforded serious 
consideration. 
The foregoing discussion raises the question of whether the 
debate about the costs and benefits of the fiduciary duty is beside 
the point.  The debate may actually be less about the balancing of 
quantifiable social utilities than about not only the role, but also 
the primacy of libertarian values.  Individual liberty could be 
viewed as having independent value, as opposed to incorporating 
it into the netting of utilities that a more communitarian ethic 
assumes.  In other words, individual freedom may be viewed as 
an incommensurate value that must be considered independently 
when making public policy.  Under this metric, a public policy 
would not be adopted if it reduced individual freedom below some 
minimum value, regardless of whether the policy would result in 
an increase in net social wealth.  Whatever form it takes, the 
libertarian metric must be explicitly considered in order to 
explore fully the pros and cons of the fiduciary duty. 
It is unlikely, however, that we will soon see an SEC study 
on the cost of a fiduciary duty as reflected in a reduction in 
individual liberty, or a reduction in investor confidence.  
Libertarian principles impose implicit constraints on, if not pose 
a direct threat to, administrative authority.60  Administrative 
agencies will respond to this challenge.  One response may be to 
shift their regulatory functions to entities that are currently 
further from Congress’s reach yet still subject to agency 
authority.  As discussed below, the result may be that it is not 
the Commission that guides the ultimate development of the 
fiduciary duty but an agency that it oversees. 
 
 
59 Although this discussion is focused on the relationship between utilitarian 
analysis and libertarian values, the straightjacket of utilitarian cost-benefit analyses 
may similarly weaken the position of more communitarian values such as those 
reflected in investor protection policies. See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27, at 
70–71, 74–75, 81–82 (statements of Mercer Bullard, Fund Democracy, and 
University of Mississippi School of Law, all three discussing derogation in cost-
benefit analysis of benefits of deterring fraud and misleading sales practices). 
60 See Robert P. Murphy, Do Libertarians Have a Problem with Authority?, THE 
AM. CONSERVATIVE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/ 
articles/should-libertarians-have-a-problem-with-authority/ (stating that “many 
people are attracted to libertarianism because they simply don’t like rules”). 
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II. THE FINRA FIDUCIARY DUTY 
If, as discussed immediately above, agency rulemaking has 
been paralyzed by political forces in the form of heightened cost-
benefit requirements,61 one might look to the development of the 
fiduciary duty under sources of law that are not so susceptible to 
direct Congressional oversight and judicial power.  One such 
source of law could be the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), the self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) for 
broker-dealers.  FINRA rulemaking and enforcement actions are 
not subject to nearly the same degree of accountability to which 
the SEC and other agencies are held.62  SEC enforcement actions 
and rulemakings are more likely to be challenged than are 
FINRA actions.  FINRA is not subject to either the 
Administrative Procedures Act or the Freedom of Information 
Act and is not subject to any statutory cost-benefit standard.63  
 
61 See Steven Sloan, Cost-Benefit Analysis Puts the Brakes on Dodd-Frank, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-07/ 
cost-benefit-analysis-puts-the-brakes-on-dodd-frank (“Business lobbyists and 
Republican lawmakers who failed to stop the Dodd-Frank Act from becoming law 
have managed to put the brakes on many of its provisions a second way: cost-benefit 
analysis.”). 
62 See Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 206–07 (2d Cir. 
1999) (The National Assocation of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), predecessor to 
FINRA, is generally not subject to constitutional requirements). 
63 However, there are rumblings that suggest that critics of regulation may be 
taking aim at FINRA’s independence and/or authority. See Investment Adviser 
Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 203(C)(b)(1) (2012) (proposing 
amendments to Investment Advisers Act to create self-regulatory organization for 
investment advisers, the rulemaking of which would be subject to APA notice and 
comment requirements); Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding 
that FINRA does not have the power to obtain judicial enforcement of fines imposed 
on members); CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 
COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA (2011) (arguing that FINRA should be 
subject to additional administrative, due process and/or transparency requirements); 
Joseph McLaughlin, Is FINRA Constitutional?, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
PRAC. GROUPS 111 (2011); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority a Government Agency? (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research 
Papers, Paper No. 86, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018396; see also 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) 
(finding unconstitutional the limitation on President’s power to terminate Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) board member). FINRA has 
occasionally referred to itself as an “independent” regulator in arguing its ability be 
oversee investment advisers who compete with FINRA’s broker-dealer membership, 
a claim that may backfire if Congress decides to treat it like any other 
administrative agency. See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6, 
at 11–13 (statement of Chet Helck, Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry & Financial 
Markets Assocation); SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, TESTIMONY OF CHET HELCK, 
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Its self-funding frees it from the kind of short-term political 
pressure that Congress exerts through its control of the SEC’s 
budget.  FINRA’s governance structure is less cumbersome than 
the SEC’s two-party system, which has evolved to echo the 
ideological culture wars more than the disinterested 
deliberations of an expert agency.64  These factors give FINRA 
 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba-wstate-
chelck-20120606.pdf (“ ‘[S]elf-regulatory organization . . . is truly a 
misnomer. . . . After many decades of legislation, oversight, and regulation, 
regulatory organizations like FINRA are not controlled, or unduly influenced, by the 
industry they regulate.”). FINRA and other SROs appear to be enhancing their cost-
benefit analyses, in part to forestall congressional action. See Nick Paraskeva, U.S. 
Self-Regulatory Bodies Move Toward Cost-Benefit Analysis, REUTERS (Oct. 9 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/10/09/u-s-self-regulatory-
bodies-move-toward-cost-benefit-analysis/; Suzanne Barlyn, FINRA To Ramp Up 
Scrutiny of Costs, Benefits of Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/us-finra-costs-idUSBRE88O1AH2012092 
5; Mark Schoeff, FINRA’s ‘Independent Regulator’ Label Gets Closer Scrutiny During 
SRO Debate, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.investment 
news.com/article/20120815/BLOG07/120819943#. 
64 For example, it has become standard practice for minority Republican 
Commissioners to file public dissents from rulemakings based on, inter alia, 
concerns regarding the adequacy of the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis that, to a large 
extent, reflect fundamentally differing views regarding the specific role of the 
Commission and the broader utility of administrative law and agencies. See, e.g., 
Gallagher Rule 506 Statement, supra note 44 (opposing conflict minerals rule); 
Paredes Minerals Statement, supra note 41 (opposing conflict minerals rule); Troy A. 
Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting To Adopt Final 
Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap. 
htm (opposing proxy access rule); Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement at Open Meeting To Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm (opposing proxy access rule); Troy A. Paredes, 
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks and Dissent Regarding Final Rule 
151A Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts (Dec. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch121708tap.htm (opposing 
equity-indexed annuities rule); Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement by SEC Commissioner Regarding Investment Company Governance 
Proposal (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062304 
psa.htm (opposing investment company governance rules); Cynthia A. Glassman, 
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Commissioner Regarding 
Investment Company Governance Proposal (June 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062304cag.htm (opposing investment company 
governance rules); see also Statement of Casey & Paredes, supra note 24 (criticizing 
Section 913 Study). Intra-Commission conflict recently reached a boiling point when 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, an independent, felt compelled to issue a public 
statement taking her fellow Republican and Democratic Commissioners to task for 
not supporting her position on money market fund regulation and calling for another 
regulatory agency to intercede, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
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much greater freedom than the Commission to impose a fiduciary 
duty on broker-dealers when providing personalized, retail 
investment advice, and advice in other situations.  Thus, 
resolving the debate about broker-dealer conduct standards may 
have more to do with choosing the source of law—government 
agency or SRO—than establishing the particular scope or 
substance of the fiduciary duty.65 
In fact, while the debate regarding the fiduciary duty has 
been focused on the SEC’s and DOL’s efforts, FINRA has been 
steadily establishing a foundation for imposing a fiduciary duty 
on the same broker–dealers to which a fiduciary rule under 
Dodd-Frank Section 913 would apply.  FINRA regulations have 
long included a strong fiduciary element.  The Commission 
described FINRA rules as “embod[ying] basic fiduciary 
responsibilities” almost twenty-five years ago,66 a 
characterization that has gained purchase ever since. 
As a general matter, FINRA members are subject to broad 
fairness standards that are structurally akin to the principles-
based fiduciary duty.67  For example, FINRA Rule 2010 requires 
 
of SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Money Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-166.htm, which was followed 
by counter-statements released by the Democratic Commissioner and two 
Republican Commissioners with whom she disagreed, see Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding Money Market Funds (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082312laa.htm; Troy A. Paredes & Daniel M. 
Gallagher, Comm’rs, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on the Regulation of Money 
Market Funds (Aug. 28, 2012), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082812dmgtap. 
htm. 
65 Even under a section 913 rulemaking, FINRA could still become the primary 
source of law as to broker-dealers’ fiduciary duties. See MERCER BULLARD, AARP 
PUB. POLICY INST., PROTECTING INVESTORS—ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY 
DUTY STANDARD 17 (2011), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/cons-prot/ 
rr2011-02.pdf. 
66 E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 34-25887, 1988 WL 
901859, at *4 (July 6, 1988). 
67 See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 2020 (2009) (“No member . . . shall effect any 
transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any security by means of any 
manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance.”); FINRA Rule 
2210(d)(1)(A), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html? 
rbid=2403&element_id=10648 (requiring that communications with the public be 
“based on principles of fair dealing and good faith, must be fair and balanced, and 
must provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular 
security or type of security, industry, or service”); FINRA Rule 5121, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=945
6 (requiring participants in public offerings to disclose prominently conflicts of 
interest); FINRA Rule 5110(b)(4)(C), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
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that members “observe high standards of commercial honor and 
just and equitable principles of trade.”68  In some circumstances, 
broker-dealers’ duties are explicitly fiduciary, such as when 
executing customer transactions.69  Other rules impose a broad 
principles-based standard and specific conduct requirements, 
which effectively couples a non-fiduciary conduct rule with a 
fiduciary-like overlay.  For example, principal transactions with 
customers must be effected at prices that are “fair, taking into 
consideration all relevant circumstances”70—a facts-and-
circumstances, fiduciary-like standard—and not exceed a five 
percent mark-up or -down limit—a bright-line, rule-based, 
nonfiduciary standard.71  Adding a further fiduciary gloss, a 
mark-up or -down of five percent or less still “may be considered 
unfair or unreasonable,” depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances.72 
The closest cousin in broker-dealer regulation to a Section 
913 fiduciary standard is FINRA’s suitability rule.  The 
suitability rule requires that members have a “reasonable basis 
to believe that a recommended transaction or investment 
strategy” is suitable for the retail customer “based on the 
information obtained through the [member’s] reasonable 
 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6831 (prohibiting participation 
in underwriting in which arrangements are “unfair or unreasonable”). 
68 FINRA Rule 2010, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504. 
69 See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37619A, 1996 
WL 506154 (Sept. 6, 1996) (“A broker-dealer's duty of best execution derives from 
common law agency principles and fiduciary obligations, and is incorporated both in 
SRO rules and, through judicial and Commission decisions, in the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws.”); FINRA Rule 5310(a)(1), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=104
55 (requiring members to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for 
the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the 
customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions”). 
70 NASD Rule 2440, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3660. 
71 NASD Rule IM–2440–1, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3661. 
72 Id. FINRA has frequently found markups of less than five percent to be 
excessive. See Dan Jamieson, FINRA Backtracks on Plan To End 5% Markup Rule, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/201302 
04/FREE/130209979 (commentator noting FINRA settlements involving three 
percent markups). 
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diligence . . . to ascertain the customer’s investment profile.”73  A 
“customer’s investment profile” includes the customer’s age, 
other investments, financial situation and needs, other 
enumerated factors, and “any other information the customer 
may [choose] to disclose.”74 
The suitability rule has been criticized by fiduciary 
advocates for not requiring that a recommendation be in the 
customer’s best interests, but only that it be suitable.75  Thus, for 
a customer for whom a variable annuity was “suitable” a broker-
dealer could recommend the variable annuity that paid him the 
highest compensation as opposed to the one that would be in the 
customer’s best interests, as discussed above.  Yet suitability 
goes some distance down the fiduciary road by establishing a 
qualitative test for investment advice that mandates that it be 
consistent with clients’ best interests, if not necessarily that it be 
the best option.76  It is, again, the kind of principles-based, fact-
dependent conduct standard that reflects the structure of a 
fiduciary standard more than that of a specific conduct rule. 
FINRA recently adopted a new suitability rule77 that, in two 
primary respects, moves the suitability standard closer to a 
fiduciary standard.78  First, in a number of ways, the new rule 
contemplates evaluating broker-dealer conduct in the context of 
 
73 FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_ 
main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (formerly NASD Rule 2310). There is a 
parallel NYSE rule—the “know your customer” rule—that became a FINRA rule in 
2011 following the merger of the two regulators in 2007. See FINRA Rule 2090, 
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403& 
element_id=9858 (formerly NYSE Rule 405) (“Every member shall use reasonable 
diligence, in regard to the opening and maintenance of every account, to know (and 
retain) the essential facts concerning every customer and concerning the authority of 
each person acting on behalf of such customer.”). 
74 FINRA Rule 2111. 
75 See BULLARD, supra note 65, at 6. 
76 See id. at 6–7. 
77 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63325, 
75 Fed. Reg. 71,479 (Nov. 23, 2010) (SEC release approving FINRA Rule 2111, 
effective July 9, 2012). 
78 See Seth Lipner, The New FINRA Suitability Rules, 1969 PLI/CORP 173, 192 
(Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with author) (FINRA’s new suitability rule does not impose a 
fiduciary duty but “brings FINRA closer to imposing such a standard on brokers”); 
Duane Thompson, FINRA’s Quasi–Fiduciary Rule, FI360 BLOG (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.fi360.com/blog; Christina N. Davilas et al., FINRA Issues Additional 
Guidance on Its New Suitability Rule, 4 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 795, 799–800 (2012) 
(FINRA “[a]nnounces a New, ‘Best Interests of the Client’ Standard” that “may be 
viewed as akin to a fiduciary duty.”). 
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the kind of comprehensive, ongoing advisory relationship with 
customers that is more akin to a fiduciary relationship.79  For 
example, FINRA expanded the rule to cover not only 
recommendations, but also “investment strategies,” which 
include situations in which a security or strategy is 
recommended, regardless of whether a transaction takes place.80  
Along with the rule’s expansion to cover “hold” recommendations, 
the inclusion of investment strategies expands the kind of 
recommendations covered by the rule well beyond the 
transactional advice that has been the core of the suitability 
rule.81 
FINRA’s assertion of authority over transactions that may 
involve non-securities, such as equity-indexed annuities, home-
equity loans, and viatical settlements,82 has further extended the 
suitability rule beyond transactions in securities to encompass, at 
least indirectly, virtually every form of financial advice.83  FINRA 
has stated that broker-dealers must design their supervisory 
procedures to detect, investigate, and follow–up on “ ‘red flags’ 






79 See Melanie Waddell, FINRA’s New Suitability Rule Edges Closer to 
‘Fiduciary’: NAPFA Chairman, ADVISORONE (July 16, 2012), http://www.advisor 
one.com/2012/07/16/finras-new-suitability-rule-edges-closer-to-fiduci. 
80 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on 
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule (2012); FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-55, Suitability: 
Guidance on FINRA’s Suitabilty Rule (2012) (modifying FINRA Regulatory Notice 
12-25). 
81 See Kenneth Corbin, FSI Wary of Investment Strategy, Hold Provisions in 
FINRA Suitability Rule, FINANCIAL PLANNING (July 9, 2012), http://www.financial-
planning.com/news/fsi-wary-of-investment-strategy-hold-provisions-in-finra-
suitability-rule-2679753-1.html (Comments of David Bellaire, General Counsel and 
Director of Government Affairs, Financial Services Institute, regarding suitability 
rule’s coverage of hold recommendations: “ ‘It’s very easy for firms to monitor a 
transaction . . . . Things happen—products are purchased or sold.’ But ‘the 
recommendation to hold is a situation where suitability rules now apply in which 
there is no clear moment, no resulting transaction.’ ”). 
82 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25; FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-55. The 
term “viatical settlement” refers to the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party. 
83 See generally Mercer Bullard, The Future of Financial Planning Regulation, 
MORNINGSTAR.COM (July 7, 2011), http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id= 
386262&CN=brf295,http://ibd.morningstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14
;frmtId=12,%20brf295. 
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investment strategy with both a security and non-security 
component,”84 which further extends the reach of investment 
strategies category discussed above. 
FINRA’s interpretation of the new rule seems to portend a 
broker-dealer duty to monitor customer accounts on an ongoing 
basis.85  An ongoing duty to monitor an account makes brokers’ 
services more closely resemble the kind of ongoing relationship of 
trust and confidence that is characteristic of a fiduciary 
relationship, in contrast with the services of a salesperson who 
only makes a one-time recommendation.86  FINRA’s January 
2011 guidance on the new suitability rule states that the broker-
dealer must “know its customers not only at account opening but 
also throughout the life of its relationship with customers in 
order to, among other things, effectively service and supervise 
the customers’ accounts.”87  It refers further to the need to verify 
essential facts about customers “at intervals reasonably 
calculated to prevent and detect any mishandling of a customer’s 
account that might result from the customer’s change in 
circumstances” and reminds broker-dealers of their obligation 
under Exchange Act Rule 17a–3 to “attempt to update certain 
account information every 36 months regarding accounts for 
which the broker-dealers were required to make suitability 
determinations.”88  These pointed assertions of an ongoing duty 
to update information imply a developing affirmative duty to 
 
84 FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 8; see, e.g., NFP Securities, Inc., FINRA 
Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, FINRA Case No. 2007011393902 (Mar. 
28, 2011) (settling for failing to supervise of equity-indexed annuities). 
85 See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 
2002) (broker-dealer ordinarily has no duty to monitor a non-discretionary account). 
86 See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(broker-client fiduciary duty is limited “to the narrow task of consummating the 
transaction requested”). Conversely, the Department has proposed to expand the 
definition of “fiduciary” under ERISA to include not only persons who provide 
investment advice on a “regular basis” but also to those who provide advice 
regarding a single transaction. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, supra note 3. 
87 FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-02, Know Your Customer and Suitability: SEC 
Approves Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer and 
Suitability Obligations (2011). Interestingly, Dodd-Frank’s rulemaking 
authorization expressly prohibited a rule that required a broker-dealer to have a 
continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing personalized 
investment advice about securities, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), yet 
FINRA’s interpretation of the new suitability rule seems to apply to certain 
customer relationships and entails precisely such a relationship. 
88 FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-02. 
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update prior recommendations periodically and make new 
recommendations based on changed circumstances as 
appropriate.  Although other FINRA guidance creates some 
doubt as to FINRA’s direction in this respect,89 it appears that, at 
a minimum, FINRA has put the suitability rule on a path of 
requiring that broker-dealers assume greater responsibility for 
the longer-term effects of their transaction and investment 
strategy recommendations. 
Thus, FINRA’s comments about ongoing monitoring and its 
authority over non-securities transactions, combined with the 
expansion of the suitability rule to cover both hold 
recommendations and investment strategies, reflect a rule that is 
decidedly moving toward a fiduciary duty.  The foregoing 
changes, like FINRA’s addition of “age, investment experience, 
time horizon, liquidity needs and risk tolerance” to the list of 
factors that broker-dealers must consider in developing a 
customer’s investment profile, envision something more akin to a 
full-blown financial planning relationship than an intermittent 
transactional relationship.90  At the same time that financial 
 
89 FINRA states that recommendations normally do “not create an ongoing duty 
to monitor and make subsequent recommendations.” FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-
25, at 7; FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-25, Know Your Customer and Suitability: 
New Implementation Date for and Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA 
Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer Suitability Obligations (2011). Further 
obscuring its January 2011 guidance, FINRA stated that a broker who meets with a 
customer for a quarterly or annual review and “remains silent regarding, or refrains 
from recommending the sale of, securities” would not be subject to the rule, even if 
the broker had “previously recommended the purchase of the securities.” Id. The 
rule would apply if the broker made an express recommendation to hold the 
securities, which seems to create an incentive to avoid potential suitability liability 
by saying nothing, even when the customer should sell—although private liability 
risk arising from silence might counsel otherwise. FINRA explains that explicit hold 
recommendations should be covered because they “constitute the type of advice upon 
which a customer can be expected to rely.” Id. However, the same reliance is likely to 
arise when a broker is silent during a customer account review meeting when there 
are securities that should be sold. It is unclear how FINRA will resolve these 
incongruities. 
90 See Corbin, supra note 81 (Comments of David Bellaire, General Counsel and 
Director of Government Affairs, Financial Services Institute, regarding suitability 
rule’s coverage of non-securities and investment strategies: “ ‘[I]t’s questionable 
whether that’s a fair requirement for firms to be experts on things outside of their 
business’. . . . ‘That goes far afield from the business that our members are engaged 
in of selling securities and monitoring the suitability of those securities,’ . . . warning 
that the rule sets ‘no outside limit’ on what constitutes a covered investment 
strategy.”). Ironically, in 2005 the Commission adopted a rule, later vacated by the 
D.C. Circuit, under which such financial planning services could have required a 
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planning organizations have pressed for separate regulation of 
financial planning as such,91 FINRA has moved aggressively to 
create and occupy that field on its own and its efforts have not 
gone unnoticed by the financial planning community.92  Through 
rulemaking—by text and interpretation—FINRA has expanded: 
(1) the idea of “suitability” to reflect the broader context in which 
broker-dealers advertise and deliver retail financial services, and 
(2) the suitability rule to impose a standard approaching the 
fiduciary standard that traditionally has applied to such advisory 
services. 
The second way in which the suitability rule has moved 
toward a fiduciary standard is by FINRA’s position that the new 
rule entails a de facto requirement that broker-dealers 
reasonably believe not only that their recommendations are 
suitable, but also that they are in the best interests of their 
customers.93  There is no question that the fiduciary duty 
applicable to advisers continues to be a higher standard, in part 
because it requires that recommendations be suitable and that 
 
broker-dealer to register under the Advisers Act. See generally Black, supra note 20, 
at 48–49. 
91 See Press Release, Certified Fin. Planner Bd., Financial Planning Coalition 
Announces Support for Professional Regulation of Financial Planners (Apr. 27, 
2009), available at http://www.cfp.net/news-events/news-release-archive/article/2009/ 
04/27 (The financial planning community has asked Congress to enact legislation 
specifically regulating the financial planning industry.). This effort was 
unsuccessful, but section 919C of the Dodd-Frank Act did require the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office to study the oversight and regulation of financial 
planers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-235, REGULATORY 
COVERAGE GENERALLY EXISTS FOR FINANCIAL PLANNERS, BUT CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ISSUES REMAIN 1 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1 
1235.pdf; see also Bullard, supra note 4 (critiquing GAO study). 
92 In 2009, the Financial Planning Association complained to the Commission 
that FINRA had exceeded its jurisdiction by bringing an enforcement action against 
a broker-dealer for offering misleading financial plans. See Letter from Richard 
Salmen, President, Fin. Planning Ass’n, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Aug. 17, 2009) (citing Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., 
Ameritas Fined $100,000 for Use of Misleading College Funding Plans To Sell 
Variable Life Products (Aug. 6, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/ 
NewsReleases/2009/P119744), available at http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/29F7D 
0C5-1D09-67A1-AC1B0DBAFF454BCE/SchapiroLetterFINRAEnforcement081709 
final.pdf; see also Letter from David Becker, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to 
Richard Salmen, President, Fin. Planning Ass’n (Aug. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/85DA73EB-1D09-67A1-7A4156FADA6BF5D2/829 
09SECresponse.pdf (responding to FPA letter). 
93 See Davilas et al., supra note 78, at 800 (“[FINRA’s] reading a fiduciary duty 
requirement into the suitability rule marks another attempted significant expansion 
of FINRA’s regulatory authority over broker-dealers.”). 
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conflicts of interest be fully disclosed, whereas broker-dealers 
generally have not been required to disclose conflicts of interest.94  
However, FINRA has applied a strong fiduciary gloss to the 
“consistent with the best interests of [investors]” formulation in 
its most recent interpretive guidance on the suitability rule.95  In 
some respects, the suitability standard reaches the same result 
as the “act in the best interests of the [customer]” standard that 
appears in Dodd-Frank Section 913 and in cases applying the 
fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act.96 
 
94 See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 
Custodial Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release 
No. 1406, 1994 WL 84902, at *2 (Mar. 22, 1994) (“Investment advisers are 
fiduciaries who owe their clients a series of duties, one of which is the duty to 
provide only suitable investment advice.”); ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
AND BROKER-DEALERS 13 (2008) (“[T]he kernel of the fiduciary obligations that 
investment advisers owe to clients is to refrain from any undisclosed conflicts of 
interest, a requirement that constrains only some broker-dealers. In addition, even 
for those requirements that appear similar to those for broker-dealers, violation may 
be viewed as much more significant.”); MICHAEL KOFFLER, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 13, 24 (2010) 
(subjecting broker-dealers to a fiduciary duty would require that they disclose the 
revenue sharing payments). Contra Barbara Black, How To Improve Retail Investor 
Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 86 (2010) (“There is little support, either in the law or 
regulatory guidance, for this distinction” between suitability and fiduciary 
obligations). Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196–97 
(1963) (fiduciary duty under section 206 of Advisers Act requires full disclosure of 
material conflicts of interest). Compare Focus Point Solutions, Inc., Release No. 
3458, 2012 WL 3863221, at *1–2 (ALJ Sept. 6, 2012) (settling charges that 
investment adviser violated section 206(2) of Advisers Act by failing to disclose 
revenue sharing payments to client), with Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 
420 F.3d 598, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (broker-dealer has no duty to disclose that Class B 
shares of mutual fund are never the best option for shareholders or that it received 
greater compensation for selling Class B shares), and Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 
218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (broker-dealer not required to disclose mutual fund 12b-
1 fees), and Morgan Stanley & Van Kampen Mut. Fund Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 108183, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2006) (“Form N-1A requires the disclosure of the total fees 
paid by the investor in connection with a securities purchase, as well as total 
commissions paid by the fund, but it does not require disclosure of how differential 
compensation is allocated. Nor does it require disclosure of the sales contests or 
management bonuses.”). The foregoing decisions in Benzon, Press and Morgan 
Stanley have not deterred the SEC’s enforcement division from bringing antifraud 
charges against and obtaining settlements with broker-dealers for failing to disclose 
revenue sharing payments. See Bullard, supra note 4, at 183 n.40. 
95 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on 
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule 3–4 (2012). 
96 In some cases, FINRA panels have interpreted the suitability rule to require 
that broker-dealers “act in the best interests of the client,” rather than merely 
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FINRA’s interpretation of the rule has made the “consistent 
with the best interests” standard essentially fiduciary in nature 
with respect to situations where a broker-dealer may be 
motivated to recommend one suitable investment over another in 
order to increase the broker-dealer’s compensation.  This is the 
same sale-motivated-by-compensation fact pattern found in the 
sale of variable annuities, which the fiduciary standard reaches 
but the suitability standard may fail to cover, according to 
fiduciary advocates.97  FINRA’s interpretation of the “consistent 
with the best interests” standard implies a duty of care, rather 
than a duty of loyalty, that may achieve the practical effect of a 
disclosure-based fiduciary duty. 
In its recent reinterpretation of the suitability rule, FINRA 
interpreted the “consistent with” formulation to “prohibit[] a 
broker from placing his or her interests ahead of the customer’s 
interests.”98  As examples, FINRA listed a series of suitability 
cases in which a broker-dealer’s recommendation was allegedly 
motivated by the prospect of higher compensation.99  It treated 
the suitability of the recommendation as separate from the 
question of whether “the broker [was] placing his or her interests 
ahead of the customer’s interests,” reflecting the view that an 
improperly motivated recommendation could violate the 
suitability rule even if the recommended investment was 
suitable.100 
The cases cited by FINRA reflect a mix of rules and 
allegations that make it difficult to pinpoint the legal standard 
being applied.  For example, a case in which a broker 
recommended transactions that triggered unnecessary additional 
fees, both suitability violations and violations of the more general 
 
“consistent with” the client’s best interests. See, e.g., Willard, Disciplinary 
Proceeding No. 2006006046401, at 16 (FINRA Dec. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/ohodecisions/p12
0850.pdf (relying on Dunbar, Disciplinary Proceeding No. C07050050, at 11 (FINRA, 
May 20, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/ 
documents/ohodecisions/p018501.pdf (using the “consistent with the customer’s best 
interests” formulation). 
97 See, e.g., Roper Testimony, supra note 20, at 7. 
98 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 3–4. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 4 (A broker is not obligated to recommend the least expensive security, 
“as long as the recommendation is suitable and the broker is not placing his or her 
interests ahead of the customer’s interests.”). 
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“fair dealing” and “commercial honor” rules were involved.101  
Indeed, FINRA’s discussion of the “consistent with” standard 
includes a long citation to general misconduct rules and other 
rules that “provide broad and significant protections to 
investors”—that is, broad enforcement authority—as if to remind 
FINRA members of the breadth of FINRA’s authority to bring 
principles-based enforcement actions that might be considered 
outside of the scope of a strict reading of the suitability rule.102  
Regardless of whether transactions that are suitable, but 
compensation-motivated, violate the suitability rule, the 
fiduciary-like flexibility of other FINRA rules, in combination 
with FINRA’s interpretive discretion as an SRO, make such 
transactions actionable.  This standard continues to lack the 
failure-to-disclose claim that a fiduciary duty would provide, and 
it is still an open question as to how well FINRA’s duty of care 
will weather challenges in courts—or before a more libertarian 
Commission—that may be less inclined than a FINRA panel to 
defer to a regulator’s rate-setting views regarding when expenses 
are so high as to make a recommendation unsuitable.103  
 
101 See Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59328, 2009 WL 223611, at *21 
(Jan. 30, 2009) (upholding FINRA disciplinary decision finding suitability violation 
based on improper mutual fund switching and violations of fair dealing and 
commercial honor rules); see also Sathianathan, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54722, 
2006 WL 3228694, at *15 (Nov. 8, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 883 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(finding suitability and fair dealing violations in part based on a recommendation to 
invest in a higher cost class of mutual fund shares); Faber, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-49216, 2004 WL 239507, at *7 (Feb. 10, 2004) (upholding the FINRA 
disciplinary decision finding unsuitable recommendations and violations of antifraud 
and commercial honor rules); Belden, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47859, 2003 WL 
21088079, at *5 (May 14, 2003) (upholding FINRA disciplinary decision finding 
suitability violation based on sales of higher-cost classes of mutual fund shares and 
violations of commercial honor rules); Evans, Complaint No. 2006005977901 9–11 
(FINRA Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/ 
documents/nacdecisions/p124603.pdf (finding that excessive and inappropriate 
trading violated suitability, excessive trading and commercial honor rules). Cf. 1st 
Global Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-54754, 2006 WL 3313842, at *7 
(Nov. 15, 2006) (settling the proceeding based on MSRB fair dealing (G-17) and 
suitability (G-19) rules and taking the position that recommending highest cost class 
of 529 shares violated fair dealing and suitability rules). 
102 See generally FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at n.23 (citing FINRA Rules 
1014, 1021, 1031, 2010, 2090, 2210, 2330, 2360, 2370, 3010 and 5310) (stating 
“[t]hese (and many other) FINRA rules provide broad and significant protections to 
investors”). 
103 For example, no court has ever ruled in favor of plaintiffs who alleged that 
fees charged by a mutual fund were excessive in violation of the fiduciary duty in 
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act. See Mercer E. Bullard, Dura, Loss 
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However, FINRA is already deeply engaged in forms of rate-
setting in other contexts104 and openly refers to part of its 
suitability rule as including a “quantitative” suitability 
standard.105  FINRA’s under the radar status as a regulator may 
permit it to expand a “quantitative” suitability duty of care to 
make up much of the ground that a Section 913 fiduciary duty 
would cover.106 
The incorporation of compensation-motivated claims in 
suitability cases places broker-dealers in a difficult position.  Any 
situation in which a broker-dealer may receive different 
compensation amounts for implementing different 
recommendations, which is the norm in the context of 
recommendations involving mutual funds and variable 
annuities,107 automatically begins to build the foundation for a 
suitability claim based on the recommendation having been 
compensation-motivated.  A broker-dealer might defend on the 
ground that the transaction was suitable, the differential 
compensation was disclosed and/or the customer consented, but 
none of these arguments is a defense to a FINRA claim that the 
recommendation was, in fact, motivated by higher 
compensation.108  Alternatively, the broker-dealer could revise 
compensation arrangements so that its compensation—and any 
nonmonetary benefits or burdens—did not vary based on the 
particular security recommended.  This “level fee” model mirrors 
 
Causation, and Mutual Funds: A Requiem for Private Claims?, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 
559, 559–60, n.5 (2008). 
104 See, e.g., FINRA Rule IM-2440-2, available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3662 (limiting markups and 
markdowns to five percent); FINRA Rule 2830(d)(1), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=369
1 (limiting mutual fund commissions to 8.5%); FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, at 
14 & nn.66–67 (citing specific turnover rates and cost-to-equity ratios in evaluating 
churning claims). 
105 FINRA Rule 2111 cmt. .05, Components of Suitability Obligations, available 
at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id= 
9859. 
106 See Davilas et al., supra note 78 (FINRA interpretation “[p]rovides that the 
suitability obligation includes a requirement to act in the ‘best interests of the 
client,’ seemingly pre-empting any rulemaking by the SEC pursuant to The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd-Frank’) that broker-
dealers are subject to a generalized fiduciary duty.”). 
107 See, e.g., Revenue Sharing from Mutual Fund Families, PRIMERICA, http:// 
shareholder.primerica.com/public/shareholder/rev_share_disc.html (last visited Jan. 
10, 2014). 
108 See discussion supra notes 98–100. 
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the approach taken under ERISA in permitted plan fiduciaries to 
provide beneficiaries with conflicted advice.109  Another defense 
would be for broker-dealers to document the reasons that a 
particular higher-compensation recommendation was the best 
option for the customer, that is, to adopt a de facto fiduciary “best 
interests” standard. 
FINRA supports imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers 
with respect to personalized, retail investment advice110 and 
appears to intend to continue moving the suitability standard 
further in that direction.  FINRA’s Vice Chairman has stated 
that FINRA intends, before any SEC rulemaking under Section 
913, to “begin implementing changes to move the standard 
forward” toward a fiduciary duty, including a proposal to require 
a disclosure document similar to the Form ADV required under 
the Advisers Act.111  FINRA views this disclosure document as a 
stepping stone toward a fiduciary standard.  [FINRA] supports 
the three principles FINRA believes are fundamental to a 
fiduciary relationship: avoiding conflicts where possible; fully 
disclosing conflicts that do exist; and taking actions that are in 
the best interests of customers.112 
This requirement to take actions that “are in” a customer’s 
best interests, rather than merely “consistent with” those 
interests, echoes Section 913’s formulation of the fiduciary 









109 See Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,135, 
66,139 (Oct. 25, 2011) (adopting rule permitting investment advice otherwise 
prohibited by ERISA where adviser’s fees do not vary based on the investment 
option selected). 
110 See Investment Adviser Oversight Act Hearing, supra note 6, at 13 (statement 
of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority). 
111 Stephen Luparello, Vice Chairman, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Remarks 
at the FSI Advocacy Summit (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/ 
Newsroom/Speeches/Luparello/P124599; see FINRA, Regulatory Notice 10-54, 
Disclosure of Services, Conflicts and Duties (2010). 
112 Luparello, supra note 111. 
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fiduciary standard in order to strengthen its case to become the 
self-regulatory organization for investment advisers,113 a goal 
toward which it made significant strides in 2011.114 
The possibility that the fiduciary debate will be played out 
based not on SEC rulemaking but on FINRA’s evolving standards 
may reflect a broader dynamic in the evolution of administrative 
law.  Financial services, like other heavily regulated industries, 
have become more complex at an accelerating rate.115  The 
agencies that oversee these industries may no longer have the 
knowledge or flexibility to adapt adequately to the speed of 
innovation.  At the same time, agencies have increasingly been 
burdened with procedural requirements and political 
interference that further limit their ability to keep pace with the 
markets that they regulate, as discussed above.  Government 
agencies have increasingly found their rulemaking initiatives 
paralyzed by internal and external political gridlock.  This 
characterization aptly describes the current state of both the 
SEC’s position on the fiduciary duty, where it cannot even 
achieve sufficient internal consensus to release a request for 
information on the costs and benefits of a fiduciary 
rulemaking116—after already failing to achieve consensus on the 
release of the staff’s Section 913 Study—and the Department of 
Labor’s fiduciary duty proposal, where a cost-benefit information 
request was released only to trigger an angry response from 
members of the President’s own party.117 
 
113 See Dan Jamieson, New FINRA Suitability Rule Worries B-Ds, INVESTMENT 
NEWS (July 8, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120708/ 
REG/307089984 (“Mr. [Hardy] Callcott [partner at Bingham McCutchen, LLP] 
thinks that Finra is trying to get a jump on overseeing a fiduciary duty in an 
attempt to bolster its case for getting oversight of advisers.”). 
114 See generally Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
115 Noreen Clancy et al., Complexity of Financial Services Industry Makes It 
Difficult for Individual Investors To Distinguish Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, RAND CORP. (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/01/03. 
html; Felix Salmon, Why Finance Can’t Be Fixed with Better Regulation, REUTERS 
BLOG (July 23, 2010, 12:24), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/07/23/why-
finance-cant-be-fixed-with-better-regulation. 
116 See Letter from Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Scott 
Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t-Sponsored Entities, House 
of Representatives (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.bdamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/SEC-response-to-GARRETT-Section-913-follow-up-2.pdf 
(stating that SEC staff was drafting a request for data “specific to the provision of 
retail financial [investment] advice”). 
117 See Cost-Benefit Hearing, supra note 27, at 2. 
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Independent agencies such as the Commission may have no 
choice but to surrender a broader range of policymaking to quasi-
governmental, or quasi-private, entities that operate one degree 
further from the zone of political conflicts.  This could be a short-
term shift that only responds to the current climate of 
heightened political polarization.118  Or it may reflect a longer-
term, natural evolution of the modern administrative state to 
policymaking arenas that are further removed from political 
processes and closer to quasi-private structures.119  One could 
crudely posit four epochs in this evolution: (1) From the pre-1900 
absence of governmental regulatory mechanisms during the birth 
of free market economies, (2) to the rise of legislative regulatory 
initiatives from 1900–1932, (3) to the delegation by legislatures 
to agencies from 1933–2000, (4) to the delegation by legislatures 
and agencies to quasi-private, self-regulatory forms from 2000 
onward.  Perhaps we are living in the age of the Fifth Branch.120 
III. THE PRIVATE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The foregoing analysis discusses the fiduciary debate in the 
context of a public duty, yet fiduciary claims, and their close 
cousin suitability claims, are addressed far more often in private 
litigation than in public enforcement actions.121  FINRA brought 
 
118 See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and 
Unequal Riches 3 (Ctr. on Insts. & Governance, Working Paper No. 5, 2005), 
available at http://igovberkeley.com/sites/default/files/No5_McCarty.pdf (voting 
patterns show increase in relative divergence of Republicans’ and Democrats’ voting 
patterns). See generally A.E. Dick Howard, The Constitution and the Role of 
Government, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 449, 489–94 (2012) (comparing consensus at the 
inception of the administrative state with current political polarization). 
119 See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 15, 22 
(2013) (discussing role of corporate form as a kind of self-regulatory structure). 
120 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L REV. 573, 579 (1984). This evolution could just 
as well be characterized as the dismantling of the Fourth Branch, with the advent of 
self-regulation representing a return to a tripartite, limited federal government. See 
Short, supra note 11, at 674–75 (finding positive correlation between expressions of 
concern that regulation is coercive and support for self-regulatory structures). Cf. 
Sunstein, supra note 57. See generally FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (administrative agencies “have become a veritable fourth 
branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories 
much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional 
thinking”); Lawson, supra note 57. 
121 Compare Clifford Kirsch et al., Understanding FINRA’s Suitability Rules: 
Possible Enforcement Actions, FINANCIAL PLANNING BLOGS (Mar. 17, 2013), 
http://www.financial-planning.com/blogs/understanding-finra-new-suitability-rules-
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only fifty-three suitability cases in 2010.  Although it doubled 
that total in 2011,122 the total still pales in comparison with the 
tens of thousands of fiduciary duty and suitability claims brought 
in court and arbitration.123  The primary source of law as to the 
scope and substance of the fiduciary duty for broker-dealers is 
private claims. 
Broker-dealers can be found to be fiduciaries under state 
common law when plaintiffs establish, for example, that they had 
a relationship of trust and confidence with their broker or where 
some inequality of bargaining position exists,124 although a 
broker-dealer’s state law fiduciary duty is not a model of 
 
knowing-your-customer-2679758-1.html, with Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRA 
DisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2013). 
122 See Kirsch et al., supra note 121. 
123 From 2002 through 2011, 61,304 arbitration claims were filed. See Dispute 
Resolution Statistics, supra note 121; see, e.g., Billings v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc., FINRA Arbitration No. 11-01948 (Oct. 12, 2012), available at 
http://finraawardsonline.finra.org/viewDocument.aspx?DocNb=59344 (finding 
respondent violated fiduciary duty to claimants and awarding monetary relief). 
124 See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1038 
(4th Cir. 1997) (under Texas law, “ ‘[f]iduciary relationships arise when a party 
occupies a position of confidence toward another’ ”); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989) (under 
Oklahoma law, “a fiduciary duty exists when the party in the weaker position 
reasonably places its confidence and responsibility in the party in the stronger 
position”); Amendolia v. Rothman, No. Civ.A 02-8065, 2003 WL 23162389, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2003) (under Pennsylvania law, the relationship between a 
securities broker and his customer is a fiduciary one as a matter of law); Courtland 
v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“When a registered 
representative is giving more than the normal amount of incidental investment 
advice, and has instilled in customer such a degree of confidence in himself and 
reliance upon his advice that the customer clearly feels, and the registered 
representative knows that the customer feels, that the registered representative is 
acting in customer’s interest, a fiduciary relationship may arise.”); Dinsmore v. Piper 
Jaffray, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 41, 46 (S.D. 1999) (applying South Dakota law, 
“[s]ecurities [b]rokers owe . . . fiduciary obligations to their clients . . . ‘a duty of 
utmost good faith, integrity and loyalty’ ”). Broker-dealers also may be found to be 
fiduciaries when they exercise discretion over a client’s account, but these cases are 
not of interest here because broker-dealers who exercise discretion are already 
subject to the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act. See Certain Broker-Dealers 
Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51523, 2005 
WL 849053, at *1 (Apr. 15, 2005) (exercise of investment discretion is not solely 
incidental investment advice and therefore not eligible for broker-dealer exemption 
from the Advisers Act), vacated by Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). They therefore are not the focus of section 913 rulemaking, which would 
primarily affect broker-dealers who are not subject to the Advisers Act. 
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clarity.125  Broker-dealer customers may also be able to bring 
contract or negligence claims under state common law that are 
indirectly based on a suitability standard, which is somewhat 
akin to a fiduciary claim.126  Thus, state law has recognized a 
variety of circumstances in which a broker-dealer may be found 
to have a fiduciary relationship with a client. 
Federal law is not nearly as hospitable to private fiduciary 
claims.127  There is no federal common law fiduciary duty outside 
the fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act, and there is no private 
right of action under the Act for a breach of the fiduciary duty.  
Nor is there is a private right action for a violation of FINRA’s 
suitability rule.128  Courts have recognized private claims for 
unsuitable recommendations under the general anti-fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws, but these claims are 
unlikely to succeed.  Plaintiffs generally must show, along with 
other elements of a fraud claim, “that the defendant knew or 
reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the buyer’s 
needs,” and “that, with scienter, the defendant made material 
misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to 
disclose material information) relating to the suitability of the 
securities.”129  This is a difficult, if not insurmountable, burden of 
proof for plaintiffs. 
 
125 See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 706 (2010) (calling broker’s fiduciary duty “a 
perplexing fusion of state and federal law”); Steven A. Ramirez, The Professional 
Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 
U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 550 (2002) (“Whether described as ‘considerable confusion’ or as 
‘judicial smoke,’ it is clear that courts have not always consistently articulated the 
fiduciary obligations of broker-dealers under state law. Even a cursory review of 
authorities shows deep division within the courts regarding the fiduciary duties of 
broker-dealers.”). 
126 See, e.g., Keenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 86–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(discussing elements of “warranty of suitability” claim); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 697 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (D.D.C. 1988) (A violation of 
the suitability rule in a common law claim “will not automatically result in [the 
broker-dealer] being held liable for negligence; it would simply be a factor 
consideration by the jury as to whether he acted as a ‘reasonable’ person in his 
conduct toward the [customer] and their account with Merrill Lynch.”); Piper, 
Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (“[T]he 
Know Your Customer Rule and the Suitability Rule may form part of the negligence 
concept in common law.”). 
127 See Black, supra note 94, at 67. 
128 See HUNG ET AL., supra note 94, at 10.  
129 Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); see also 
Coleman & Co. Sec., Inc. v. Giaquinto Family Trust, 236 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 n.10 
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This scienter-proof problem could be remedied by legislation 
requiring that a broker-dealer show, as it must do in a FINRA 
proceeding, that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a 
recommendation was suitable.  To comport with the scope of 
Section 913, this burden could be limited to particularized 
investment advice provided to retail investors.  For example, 
Section 21D of the Exchange Act could be amended to provide as 
follows: 
In any private action arising under this title in which a 
plaintiff who is a retail investor proves that the defendant 
provided particularized investment advice that was unsuitable, 
the defendant shall have the burden of proving that the 
defendant had a reasonable belief that the advice was suitable 
based on the exercise of reasonable diligence.130 
This provision would leave the burden of proof on investors 
to show that a recommendation was actually unsuitable, but then 
shift the burden to the broker-dealer—where it already resides 
under the FINRA suitability rule—to  show that the broker-
dealer had a reasonable basis, based on the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, to believe that the recommendation was 
suitable.  However, plaintiffs would still be left to deal with the 
hurdles created by the steady erosion of private rights of action 
under the federal securities law over the last two decades.131 
A more significant problem for both state and federal private 
claimants may be that most broker-dealer customers do not have 
the right to bring claims in court.  Since the Supreme Court’s 
McMahon decision in 1987 upholding a mandatory arbitration 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Unsuitability cannot be shown by negligence alone.”); Cremi v. 
Brown, 955 F. Supp. 499, 517–18 (D. Md. 1997). But cf. Stein, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-47335, 2003 WL 431870, at *4 n.31 (Feb. 10, 2003) (“Scienter is not an 
element for finding a violation of the NASD suitability rule.”). 
130 Section 21D sets forth various requirements for private actions under the 
Exchange Act, such as those relating to pleading standards, lead plaintiffs, loss 
causation and limitations on damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). 
131 Private rights of action have been eroded by the Private Litigation Securities 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, and 
a series of Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2883–84 (2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 
313–14 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005); Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191–92 
(1994). 
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clause in a broker-dealer’s customer agreement,132 these clauses 
have become de rigueur in the industry.133  From 2002 through 
2011, more than 60,000 arbitration claims were filed.134  No 
similar data is available for comparable state and federal court 
claims, but it is reasonable to assume, in light of the prevalence 
of mandatory arbitration clauses, that they are greatly 
outnumbered by arbitration claims.  Thus, it is arbitration 
panels, not courts, that are the primary source of law for private 
claims based on fiduciary and suitability duties. 
There is reason to believe that suitability and fiduciary 
claims have some success in arbitration proceedings.135  Breach of 
fiduciary duty was the most frequently asserted claim from 2008 
through mid-2012; suitability claims consistently made the top 
six.136  Arbitration counsel presumably would not bring so many 
of these claims if they were not somewhat successful, but how 
successful they are is unknown.137  Arbitrators are not required 
to follow any particular source of substantive law, such as public 
law standards established by the Commission or FINRA, or to 
provide an explanation of their decisions unless both parties 
request one,138 and the requirement that those appealing an 
 
132 Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); see also 
Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) 
(upholding mandatory arbitration agreement as to claim arising under Securities 
Act of 1933). 
133 See Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable 
Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration 
as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 622 (2010) 
(“Virtually every customer agreement contains an explicit clause requiring that 
disputes be heard in arbitration.”); Black, supra note 94, at 68. 
134 See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121. 
135 See Black, supra note 94, at 68 (“[I]t is generally believed that investors 
frequently do recover damages from broker-dealers and investment advisers for 
careless or incompetent advice.”). 
136 For example, of the 4,729 arbitration claims filed in 2011, 1,619 (thirty-four 
percent) and 2,589 (fifty-five percent) included, respectively, unsuitability and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121. 
137 See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator Background and 
Representation on Arbitration Outcomes 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 12-17, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109712 (“The absence of detailed case-specific 
information creates challenges for empirical research, making evaluation of 
arbitration’s effectiveness in protecting investors’ rights exceedingly difficult.”). 
138 See FINRA Rule 12904, available at, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192. But cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 105, 116 Stat. 745 (permitting PCAOB proceedings to 
be public only if the PCAOB finds good cause and both sides consent); H.R. 3503, 
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arbitration decision show a manifest disregard for the law is 
almost impossible to satisfy.139  These factors frustrate any 
attempt to determine the legal standard under which fiduciary 
and suitability claims are resolved.  There is good reason to be 
concerned about how arbitration panels decide cases.  The 
number of arbitration panels that have no industry 
representative has increased since FINRA allowed plaintiffs to 
opt for an all-public panel,140 which may have resulted in less 
expertise on panels and, accordingly, less predictability as to the 
law applied.141 
Some commentators have dealt with the dearth of 
information on the basis of arbitration decisions by extrapolating 
from data on litigated outcomes.  A common approach has been 
to analyze investors’ win rates to determine whether arbitration 
is “fair”—the theory being that the percentage of litigated 
outcomes in which the investor prevails indicates whether 
arbitration has a pro-industry or pro-investor bias.  FINRA data 
shows that, from 2007 through July 2012, the percentage of 
decided cases in which claimants recovered monetary damages or 
obtained non-monetary relief ranged from thirty-seven to forty-
seven percent.142  On the one hand, one might conclude that, 
 
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (requiring public PCAOB proceedings except by 
determination of Board); see Black, supra note 94, at 68; Barbara Black & Jill I. 
Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 995–98 (2002) (discussing whether and to what extent FINRA 
arbitrators apply substantive law). 
139 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured 
Creditors’ Comm. of Bayou Grp., 491 F. App’x 201, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2012). 
140 Dan Jamieson, All-Public Panels Are a Hit with Investors, FINRA Says, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 29, 2012, 7:16 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20120129/REG/301299988 (percentage of investor claimants choosing an all-
public panel rose from fifty-four during twenty-seven-month pilot program to 
seventy-six during first full year after full implementation). 
141 See Choi et al., supra note 137, at 8 (“[M]ore knowledgeable arbitrators are 
likely to produce more accurate awards. Broker-customer disputes frequently 
involve technical issues in which familiarity with industry practices is valuable. 
Securities expertise enables an arbitrator to understand the nature of the claims 
better.”); SIFMA, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 36–
37 (2007) [hereinafter SIFMA White Paper], available at http://www.sifma.org/ 
uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_society/whitepaperonarbitration
-october2007.pdf (industry arbitrators’ expertise improves arbitration); Jamieson, 
supra note 140 (quoting industry arbitrators: “[e]liminating industry panelists ‘is a 
mistake’ . . . ‘Finra doesn’t do a good job of educating [public] arbitrators about 
investments’ . . . ‘the public arbitrators are generally unprepared’ ”). 
142 See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 121 (2007: 37%; 2008: 42%; 
2009: 45%; 2010: 47%; 2011: 44%; 2012: 45%). 
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because in each year investors recovered nothing in more than 
half of these cases, arbitration was biased against them.  On the 
other hand, based on other data showing a higher percentage of 
outcomes favorable to investors, some have concluded that 
arbitration is not biased against investors.143  For example, an 
oft-cited 1992 GAO report found no industry bias based in part 
on its finding that fifty-nine percent of litigated arbitrations were 
decided in favor of investors, and that monetary awards to 
investors averaged sixty-one percent of the amount of their 
claims.144  In his 2002 report, Professor Michael Perino similarly 
concluded that arbitration was not biased because of the balance 
of litigated outcomes.145 
This empirical approach is fraught with problems.  For 
example, what qualifies as a “win” is inherently subjective.  
FINRA counts investors as prevailing when they recover 
monetary damages or other non-monetary relief, regardless of 
how small.  In some of these cases, defendants would 
undoubtedly consider themselves to have prevailed.  Even when 
investors recover monetary damages, most awards go 
uncollected.146  These analytical weaknesses have been 
recognized previously and are not necessarily fatal.  However, 
evaluating arbitration based on outcomes and relief awarded 
actually may miss the point altogether.  The issue is whether 
arbitration reaches the “right” result, not whether one side or the 
other prevails in a certain percentage of cases.  Investors could 
 
143 See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 141 (citing outcomes percentages as 
evidence of no industry bias in arbitration); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE 35–39 (1992) [hereinafter GAO, 
HOW INVESTORS FARE], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151835.pdf; U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 23 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, ACTIONS 
NEEDED], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156962.pdf (concluding that 
“investors have not fared as well” because investor win rate declined from fifty-nine 
percent to fifty-one percent from 1992 to 1996 and to fifty-six percent and fifty-seven 
percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively). 
144 See GAO, HOW INVESTORS FARE, supra note 143, at 35. The GAO reached the 
same conclusions in an updated report. See GAO, ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 143, 
at 4–5, 7. 
145 See MICHAEL PERINO, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN 
NASD AND NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 30–34 (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf. 
146 See GAO, ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 143, at 5 (estimating that $129 
million (eighty percent) of $161 million awarded to investors in FINRA arbitration 
was unpaid). 
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win fifty percent of all arbitrations, which some would interpret 
to mean that arbitration was fair, but if cases in which plaintiffs 
prevailed consistently involved situations in which there was no 
legal basis for finding that the defendant owed a legal duty or 
that the duty was violated, then, in fact, arbitration would be 
unfairly biased in favor of plaintiffs. 
Extrapolating “fairness” from litigated outcome data seems 
inherently flawed because the determinant of litigation outcome 
rates is not “fairness,” but prior litigation outcome rates.  If the 
parties to arbitrations act efficiently, they will litigate to a final 
outcome rather than settle only when there is enough 
uncertainty regarding the outcome that they are unable to reach 
agreement on the expected value of the claim.  If arbitrators 
consistently reach unfair outcomes, the parties will adjust their 
analysis of the expected value of their claims, which will in turn 
shift the set of facts under which there is sufficient outcome 
uncertainty to litigate.  The cases in which outcomes may be 
uncertain and the parties therefore choose to litigate may 
comprise exclusively cases that plaintiffs, or defendants, should 
always win.  In other words, every outcome might be unfair, no 
matter how outcomes are split. 
An efficient arbitration “market” should produce litigation 
outcomes each year that reflect a normal distribution curve, with 
the midpoint reverting to a long-term mean as parties adjust 
their litigation decisions to incorporate the most recent set of 
outcome data.147  In other words, litigation outcomes necessarily 
represent an equilibrium point that moves in relation to prior 
outcomes based on participants’ past experience, regardless of 
the fairness of any particular set of prior outcomes.148  The 




147 The GAO indirectly acknowledged this point in positing as one reason for a 
declining win rate for investors that “broker-dealers [were] more likely to try to 
settle cases that they think they might lose.” Id. at 24. 
148 This equilibrium theory is consistent with findings that investors fare better 
when represented by an attorney because one would expect an attorney to have more 
experience evaluating when a case’s expected litigation value exceeds the value of 
any settlement terms. See id. at 26 (Investors were twenty-seven percent more likely 
to receive an award when represented by an attorney). Investors who are not 
represented by attorneys presumably generally overestimate their chances of 
success, leading to a lower percentage of favorable litigated outcomes. 
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of either party prevailing are about equal, regardless of whether, 
under that set of facts, the odds of either party prevailing should 
be equal. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop a theory 
regarding the irrelevance of investor win rates.  For purposes of 
this Article, the point is that we cannot evaluate the efficacy of 
existing fiduciary or fiduciary-like private claims because the 
arbitration system prevents us from knowing how these claims 
fare in arbitration.  In other contexts, legal standards can be 
debated largely because judges’ explanations of their decisions 
can be analyzed, categorized, and regurgitated in forms that 
identify and reinforce consistent principles of law as applied to 
generally similar fact patterns.  When adjudicative forums do not 
afford such transparency, the rights and obligations of 
individuals become unknowable. 
This might not be a concern where only a small percentage of 
disputes are heard by the nontransparent forum.  When 
nontransparent forums operate on the periphery of a dominant 
core of transparent forums, they are likely to follow the law as 
applied in explained decisions in the latter forums.  When 
adjudicators in these forums are retired judges who have spent 
decades creating, applying, and following this legal core, they 
may be likely to continue to do so even when their decisions are 
no longer subject to public scrutiny.  Even if non-transparent 
forums do not follow this legal core, the social costs are small 
because these peripheral decisions make up only a small 
minority of disputes.  However, when the overwhelming majority 
of cases involving a set of legal principles are decided in a non-
transparent forum by non-judge decision-makers who have no 
industry expertise, achieving correct legal outcomes may be as 
likely as a roll of the dice.149  Yet this is how the majority of 
private claims against broker-dealers based on fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like legal principles are decided. 
 
 
149 But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2013) (authorizing confidential 
arbitration of business disputes with both parties’ consent before state judge); Del. 
Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, No. 1:11–1015, 2012 WL 3744718, at *10 (D. Del. Aug. 
30, 2012) (Delaware proceedings under 10 Del. C. § 349 violate First Amendment 
public right of access to civil trials); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, § 105, 116 Stat. 745; H.R. 3503, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
FINAL_BULLARD 2/27/2014  6:20 PM 
378 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:337   
The mandatory, non-transparent nature of arbitration 
frustrates any attempt to develop a public, Section 913 fiduciary 
duty for broker-dealers that works in harmony with broker-
dealers’ preexisting private legal obligations.  How the fiduciary 
duty is applied in arbitration is a necessary component of any 
reasonable attempt to develop a uniform fiduciary duty with 
respect to retail investment advice,150 but the SEC’s Section 913 
Study had virtually nothing to say about this primary source of 
fiduciary law.  The Commission should give greater consideration 
to Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which granted the 
Commission broad authority to regulate the terms of mandatory 
arbitration clauses.151  A good use for that authority would be to 
adopt rules requiring arbitrators to explain their decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s Section 913 rulemaking has run aground on the 
shoals of heightened cost-benefit requirements and expectations 
that cannot practicably be satisfied.  Their impracticability may 
be by design, as they may simply be cover for libertarian values 
quite different from the utilitarian values that cost-benefit 
analysis presupposes.  The Obama Administration, once a 
principal instigator of the push for a fiduciary duty,152 has now 
become an advocate for deregulatory initiatives under the JOBS 
Act, which was passed with bipartisan Congressional support.  
The courts have repeatedly demonstrated their hostility toward 
SEC rulemaking, and Republican SEC Commissioners have set 
the stage for a legal challenge on cost-benefit grounds to any 
Section 913 rulemaking.  The near-term prospects for Section 913 
rulemaking by the Commission are slim. 
 
150 See generally Strine, 2012 WL 3744718, at *5 (discussing benefits of public 
proceedings). 
151 Section 919B of the Dodd-Frank Act also required the Commission to study 
ways to improve investor access to registration information relating to broker-
dealers, including arbitration proceedings. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVED INVESTOR ACCESS TO REGISTRATION 
INFORMATION ABOUT INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 1 (2011), 
available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/919bstudy.pdf. The study did not 
consider the mandatory publication of explanations of arbitration decisions. 
152 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 71 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf (“Standards of care for all broker-dealers when providing 
investment advice about securities to retail investors should be raised to the 
fiduciary standard to align the legal framework with investment advisers.”). 
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However, the appropriate context in which to consider the 
fiduciary duty is far broader than merely SEC rulemaking.  The 
goals of the fiduciary duty can be achieved through other sources 
of law that are not as susceptible to political influence.  Indeed, 
while the SEC’s rulemaking stalls, FINRA has been applying a 
form of fiduciary duty to broker-dealers.  FINRA’s rules have had 
a strong fiduciary element for quite some time, and its recent 
interpretation of its suitability rule represents a significant shift 
closer to a Section 913 fiduciary standard.  FINRA has an 
incentive to continue this process because enhancing its 
credibility as a promulgator and enforcer of a fiduciary duty 
should help its bid to become the self-regulatory organization for 
investment advisers.  Fiduciary duty advocates might do well to 
redirect their efforts away from the SEC arena and toward 
FINRA as a more reliable ally. 
One difficulty with this approach is that FINRA is not even 
the primary source of fiduciary law for broker-dealers.  Fiduciary 
claims are litigated most often in private lawsuits.  Most private 
claims are brought in arbitration proceedings, where fiduciary 
claims are more frequently asserted than any other.  Thus, there 
is a well-established body of private law under which broker-
dealers are already subject to a fiduciary duty when providing 
particularized investment advice to retail customers, but the 
Section 913 Study had nothing to say about the substance or 
scope of this source of law, in part because arbitrators are not 
required to explain their decisions.  The first step in the coherent 
development of a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers would be 
to evaluate whether the benefits of requiring arbitrators to reveal 
how that standard is already being applied would outweigh the 
potential costs. 
 
